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Findings from Prior Joint Program Research
• “Joint programs, whether large or small, in development or production, and irrespective of 
age, are statistically more likely to encounter programmatic breaches than their single 
system counterparts.”
— “The Acquisition of Joint Programs: The Implications of Interdependencies ” by Brown, Flowe, Hamel
• “The resistance to bi-service programs is thus deep-seated and powerful… When asked 
to consolidate programs they will make powerful arguments in favor of the attributes of 
their own proposal and against the attributes of the other service’s proposal.”
— “Inter-Service Weapons Rivalry ” by Robert F. Coulam
• “The common problems that cause delays and cost overruns can typically be attributed to 
‘mission creep’ requirements that surface during the SDD phase.” 
— “Program Management Challenges in a Joint Service Environment” by LtCol Dorothy E. Taneyhill
• “…Service parochialism… conspires to ensure that individual Service equities… dominate 
the acquisition process.”
— “Reforming the Joint Acquisition Process ” by Brinson, Jones, and Kelly
• “Pentagon decisionmaking reforms since World War II are largely a history of efforts to 
curtail the power of the Services to veto joint solutions that serve the entire military 
better.”
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5. As the schedule 
slips, one program 
decides to leave the 
joint program and 
develop its own 
custom software.
6. With one stakeholder 
gone, the amortized costs 
for  the other programs 
increase further—and 
another program leaves.
1. A JPO PM has six 
stakeholder programs 
planning to use their
joint infrastructure 
software…
2. …but each program 
demands at least one 
major feature be added 
to the software just 
for them.
4. The additional design 
changes and coding 
significantly  increase 
total cost, schedule,
complexity, and risk.
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Joint Programs
3. The JPO agrees to the 
additional requirements, for 
fear of losing stakeholders 
(who could build custom software).
7. As cost escalates 
and schedules lengthen, 
participation in the 
joint program unravels 
and collapses.
This scenario aggregates 
three SEI software-reliant 
system acquisition ITAs 
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What are Social Dilemmas?
What if we all could be better off, but no one has an incentive to change?  
Dilemmas are all about cooperation—and there are two basic types:
Social Trap: “The Tragedy of the Commons”
• Someone wants a benefit that will cost everyone else
• Some are tempted by that benefit, but if all do, everyone is worse off. 
Social Fence: “Producing a Public Good”
• Someone faces a near-term cost that would benefit everyone else
• Some try to avoid the cost, but if all do, everyone is worse off.  
Social Trap Examples:
Overfishing: Everyone catching more fish will mean there are no more fish
Congestion: Everyone using a car for their convenience creates traffic jams
Pollution: It’s cheaper to pollute, but everyone else pays the price in smog
“Individually optimal decisions lead to collectively inferior solutions”
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What Key Mechanisms Undermine Joint Programs?
Stakeholders of joint programs demand additional (custom) 
requirements later in the lifecycle
• The more time that elapses between establishing the baseline requirements 
and introducing new requirements, the more effort it takes to develop the 
software for those requirements. 
Underbidding is used to win development contracts
• Underbidding leads to schedule pressure that can shortcut quality processes 
and increase firefighting and staff burnout.
Developers are motivated to show good progress early in 
development
• Failing to address the hardest requirements early in the development lifecycle 
(such as in the first increment) in order to show better progress, leads to 
greater rework to address them later in the lifecycle, slowing progress.
Understanding the underlying mechanism that drives joint program collapse is essential to fixing it
Take-away
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Grounding and Validating the Model
Model Validation Approaches:
1) Historical Joint Program Performance Data
• Data tracking the monthly progress was obtained from the PMO and contractor, and 
correlated with a timeline of other events/actions/decisions
2) Joint Acquisition Program Workshops
• Conducted two 2-day workshops, each held with senior experts from a single joint program
• Human subject research protocol ensured confidentiality of the data collected
3) Game-based Joint Program Experiment
• Some “less attractive” behaviors of joint program stakeholders aren’t willingly revealed
• Developing web-based game engine to host controlled experiments with experienced 
acquisition staff, to collect data on realistic behaviors in joint acquisition scenarios
Collected Quantitative and Qualitative Data Corrects and Refines the Initial Model
• Refine joint program model structure based on the empirical stakeholder behaviors
• Use collected performance data to drive selected joint program model inputs
• Compare model simulation performance to historical program performance
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Key Research Findings
There is an inherent “social trap” at the heart of a joint program
• The JPO accepting more late custom requirements to keep stakeholder programs 
engaged (to prevent defection/collapse) is a “no win” social trap that leads to program 
collapse, especially when an unrealistic schedule exacerbates the expanded scope. 
Mandated joint program participation can have severe unintended consequences
• If a stakeholder program is unwillingly forced to join a joint program, they will  find a way 
to leave—and their defection will likely lead to a cascade of defections that will collapse 
the joint program
A key tipping point is crossed due to 
unrealistic schedules/late requirements
• Developer productivity as a function of 
schedule realism & late-addition req’ts
• Program managers need to know if they’re 
about to “fall off a cliff” at a tipping point
Stakeholders played “Schedule Chicken”
• Stakeholder platforms hid their own 
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• CON: May 
escalate and 
cause retaliation
• PRO: Regulates 
the good, 
prevents overuse
• CON: Unpopular 
to enforce a 
mandate




• CON: Incentive 
may be far in the 
future
• PRO: Gives 
incentive to 
care for what’s 
yours




Goal: Decrease custom requirements demanded by stakeholder programs
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Conclusions
Current Status
• Preliminary observations show a tipping point toward much lower overall 
development productivity contributing to the joint program social dilemma
Potential Areas of Future Research
• Model possible solution approaches and analyze their effectiveness
– Identify the most promising solution(s) to be piloted on real programs
• Forecast acquisition program performance 
– Use a parameterized model as a management decision support tool
– Run “what if?” scenarios on acquisition programs in progress & compare outcomes
– Generate 3-D maps of the decision space to help decision-makers navigate it
• Influence future policy for joint acquisition programs
– Help shape how joint acquisition programs are conducted through policy changes 
via the Service Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs) and DoD
• Create an acquisition Management Flight Simulator
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